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The Fatal Flaw in NAIFTA, GATT and
All Other Trade Agreements
Robert W. McGee*
I. INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of articles and books that have been written
about trade and trade policy - nearly all - look at trade from a
utilitarian perspective. Utilitarians take the position that if free trade
is a good policy, it is good because the vast majority benefits. Free
trade gives consumers more choices. It gives them lower prices. It
creates more jobs than it destroys. It is a positive-sum game. An un-
derlying assumption of most utilitarian-based trade arguments is that
governments have some inherent right to regulate trade.-
This article looks at trade policy from a different perspective.
While utilitarian approaches to trade have some value, and while utili-
tarian arguments often -and rightly - conclude that free and un-
restricted trade is the best policy, they do so for the wrong reason.
This article points out that the real reason why totally free and un-
restricted trade is good is because it is the only trade policy that does
not violate individual rights. While governments have the authority to
regulate trade,' they do not have the right to do so. It is possible to
have the authority to do something even though one does not have
the right. An extreme example to illustrate this point would be the
situation in Nazi Germany, where Hitler's death camp goons had the
authority to murder Jews, gypsies and Poles. Although they had the
authority to do so, they did not have the right. The same is true of
* Professor at the W. Paul Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University in South Or-
ange, New Jersey.
1 The United States Constitution, for example, gives Congress the authority to regulate
trade in Article I, Section 8: "The Congress shall have Power.. .To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations."
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governments and trade policy. Governments have the authority to
regulate trade, and they have the power, but they do not have the
right, because the regulating of trade between consenting adults vio-
lates property and contract rights and goes beyond the legitimate
scope of government.
Of course, this position assumes that governments have a limited
role. If one begins with the premise that the legitimate role of govern-
ment is restricted to the protection of life, liberty and property2 and
that individuals should otherwise be free to regulate their own affairs,
then the role of government does not include trade regulation (or
rather trade restriction),3 because such activity is beyond the legiti-
mate scope of government. When government goes beyond these ba-
sic functions of protecting life, liberty and property, it becomes a
redistributive state.4 In order to give something to some individuals
or groups, it must first take something from others because govern-
ments have no resources of their own. Whatever resources they have
they must first take from someone.
Frederic Bastiat, the nineteenth century French economist and
philosopher, had the following view of what determines whether a law
is good or bad:
See if the law takes from some persons what belongs to them, and gives
it to other persons to whom it does not belong. See if the law benefits
one citizen at the expense of another by doing what the citizen himself
cannot do without committing a crime. Then abolish this law without
delay, for it is not only an evil itself, but also it is a fertile source for
further evils because it invites reprisals. If such a law - which may be
an isolated case - is not abolished immediately, it will spread, multiply,
and develop into a system.5
Such laws constitute legal plunder for Bastiat because they allow
some individuals to use the force of government to rob others.6 Trade
2 Numerous philosophers over the centuries have taken this position. For detailed argu-
ments to support this position, see JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT
(1690; 1986); ROBERT NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); TIBOR MACHAN, INDI-
VIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS (1989).
3 There is a subtle, yet distinct difference between trade regulation and trade restriction.
Trade restriction prevents trade between consenting adults. Trade regulation need not involve
restriction if it confines its role to establishing a rule of law by which trade can be facilitated.
4 For a detailed philosophical critique of the redistributive state, see BERTRAND DE
JouvENEL, THE ETHIcs OF REDISTRIBUTION (1952).
5 FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 21 (1950). This book was originally published in 1850 as a
pamphlet, LA LoI, reprinted in SoPtIsMEs ECONOMIOUES, VO1. I of OEUVRES COMPLTFS DE
FRPDtRiC BASTIAT, 4th ed. (Paris: Guillaumin et C 1878), at 343-94.
6 For some modem examples of such laws, see DEAN RUSSELL, GOVERNMENT AND LEGAL
PLUNDER: BASTIAT BROUGHT Up TO DATE (1985); DOUG BANDOW, THE POLITICS OF PLUN-
DER: MISGOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON (1990).
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laws like NAFTA, GAIT and the others do the same.7 These agree-
ments are not true free trade agreements, although they do contain
elements of free trade. NAFTA,8 GATT9 and the other trade agree-
ments that are hundreds or even thousands of pages long are not re-
ally about free trade. They are about how the plunder gained from
protectionism is to be divvied up. In the case of NAFTA, for example,
protectionist policies in some areas are allowed to exist for 15 more
years.10 So those who benefit by protectionist policies have the legal
7 Tariffs, quotas and antidumping laws are the usual tools used to protect domestic produ-
cers at the expense of consumers. But they are not the only tools. Deliberately manipulating a
currency's exchange rate also has the effect of keeping foreign products from crossing borders.
The U.S. policy of deliberately weakening the dollar in comparison to the yen, for example,
caused the dollar to drop by eighteen percent in the first eight months of 1993, which made it
possible for barely one in fifty Japanese exporters to be profitable in the United States market.
During the 1930s, monetary nationalism of this kind was a factor that set the stage for World
War 1I. For more on these points, see Judy Shelton, A Yen to Manipulate, WALL ST. J., January
28, 1994, at A14.
It might also be pointed out that, while manipulating exchange rates can be protectionist,
this tool differs from the other tools of protectionism - tariffs, quotas and antidumping laws -
because manipulating exchange rates is more pervasive. Whereas tariffs, quotas and anti-dump-
ing laws can target a particular industry or company, manipulating exchange rates can cause all
foreign products to become more expensive in the domestic market.
The goal of such a policy is to reduce trade deficits. Yet reducing trade deficits is not a
worthy goal. The relationship between a trade deficit and economic growth is nebulous, at best.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the United States had a negative balance of trade.
Yet the nineteenth century was a period of rapid and prolonged economic growth. The United
States had a positive balance of trade during the Great Depression of the 1930s, one of the worst
periods the United States economy ever faced. For more on the irrationality of the balance of
trade philosophy, see Robert W. McGee, Trade Deficits and Economic Policy: A Law and Eco-
nomics Analysis, 11 J.L. & Com. 159-74 (1991-2).
8 The North American Free Trade Agreement.
9 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
10 For some discussions of NAFTA, see GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. ScOrr,
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992); GARY CLYDE HUF-
BAUER & JEFFREY J. ScHOTr, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT (REV. ED. 1993); ASSESSING NAFTA:
A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS (Steven Globerman & Michael Walker eds., 1993); NAFTA AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1993); PHILIP L. MARTIN, TRADE AND MIGRATION:
NAFTA AND AGRICULTURE (1993); U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/T-GGD-93-44,
North American Free Trade Agreement: A Focus on the Substantive Issues (1993); U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm., Pub. 2516, Economy-Wide Modeling of the Economic Implications of a FTA with Mexico
and a NAFTA with Canada and Mexico: Report on Investigation No. 332-317 Under Section 332
of the Tariff Act of 1930 (1992); U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Pub. 2508, Economy-Wide Modeling of
the Economic Implications of a FTA with Mexico and a NAFTA with Canada and Mexico: Ad-
dendum to the Report on Investigation No. 332-317 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930
(1992); U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Pub. 2596, Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected
Industries of the North American Free-Trade Agreement- Report to the Committee on Finance of
the United States Senate on Investigation No. 332-337 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of
1930 (1993); U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Pub. 2541, Potential Effects of a North American Free Trade
Agreement on Apparel Investment in CBERA Countries: Report to the United States Trade Rep-
resentative on Investigation No. 332-314, (1992); U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Pub. 2460, Rules of
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authority to fleece consumers for another decade and a half. If
NAFTA were a true free trade agreement, it would only require one
sentence, not hundreds of pages. That sentence might read something
like this: "As of January 1, 1994, all trade exclusively involving Mex-
ico, the United States and/or Canada will be treated the same as trade
involving New Jersey and Kansas." But NAFTA (and the numerous
other trade agreements that could be named) do not have such lan-
guage. They go into great detail describing which special interest is
protected for how long. Farmers, the steel industry, the auto industry,
the textile industry and countless other special interest groups all re-
ceive special deals in many of these so-called "free" trade agreements.
These free trade laws have developed into the systems that Bastiat
warned us about.
Part II of this article reviews utilitarian approaches to trade policy
and points out the weaknesses of the utilitarian approach. Part III
presents the rights approach to trade policy, which is superior to the
utilitarian approach for several reasons. Part IV summarizes the arti-
cle and presents conclusions.
II. UTILITARIAN APPROACHES TO TRADE POLICY
A. Free Trade Results in Lower Prices
The free trade literature" is replete with examples of how free,
unregulated trade results in lower prices.12 But such empirical evi-
dence is not needed to prove the point. This conclusion can be
reached a priori.'3 It just makes sense that prices are lower where
Origin Issues Related To NAFTA and the North American Automotive Industry: Report to the
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, On Investigation No. 332-314
Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (1991).
11 For summaries of the major arguments that have been put forth for and against free trade
over the centuries, see Robert W. McGee, The Trade Policy of a Free Society, 19 CAP. U.L. REv.
301-41 (1990). For a more detailed critique of trade policy, see ROBERT W. MCGEE, A TRADE
POLICY FOR FREE SocIETIEs: Tim CASE AGAINST PROTECTIONISM (1994).
12 Any general economics text discusses this point, as do books on monopoly theory and
practice. For some books that provide interesting examples, see GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH
OF CONSERVATISM (1963); GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916 (1965);
JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD (1991).
13 An a priori proposition can be defined as "one that can be known to be true, or false, only
by reference to experience, except in so far as experience is necessary for understanding its
terms. An aposteriori proposition can be known to be true, or false, only by reference to how, as
a matter of contingent fact, things have been, are, or will be." ANTONY FLEW, A DICTnONARY
OF PmLosOPiY 15 (1979). Emphasis added by author. Most economists are empiricists. They
base their ideas and theories on empirical evidence. But some economists take a different, a




there is competition than where there is not. Economists would say
that the supply curve shifts to the right when competitors are permit-
ted to enter a particular market. And as any student of price theory
knows, when the supply curve shifts to the right, the price declines. 4
Monopoly has just the opposite effect on prices. Where there is
monopoly, prices tend to be higher than where there is competition.
Trade policies that restrict competition give a partial or total monop-
oly to the supplier(s) that are presently in the market. Their incentive
to reduce price to gain market share is reduced or nonexistent because
they already have the market to themselves. If General Motors were
the only auto manufacturer allowed to sell cars in the United States, it
would reduce prices only because it wanted to put two cars in every
garage, not because it wanted to compete with foreign auto producers.
If it were the only company permitted to sell cars in the domestic
market, there would be no foreign competition with which to be
concerned.
Free trade also means the absence of tariffs. And tariffs are
tacked on to the prices that consumers must pay for foreign products.
Thus, this tacking will not take place in a truly free trade regime be-
cause tariffs will be zero. Thus, whether a protectionist policy takes
the form of a tariff or a trade barrier that prevents foreign producers
from competing in the domestic market, a policy of free trade leads to
lower prices. Either the supply is increased because foreign producers
are allowed to sell in the domestic market, or tariffs are zero.
Using the antidumping laws to beat up on foreign competitors
also has a tendency to raise the prices consumers must pay for prod-
ucts.15 Antidumping laws put a chilling effect on price competition.
The only way that foreign competitors can insulate themselves from
being hit with an antidumping investigation is to keep their prices rel-
atively high; even then they are not fully protected. It is possible for a
foreign producer to be found guilty of dumping even if it charges the
same price for its product everywhere it has sales.' 6
14 Any price theory text discusses this point, as does the price theory section of any general
economics text.
15 For a critical analysis of the antidumping laws, see Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal
the Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw J. Irr'tL L. & Bus. 491-562 (1993).
16 Michael S. Knoll, United States Antidumping Law: The Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEx.
INT'L LJ. 265, 280 (1987).
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B. Free Trade Increases Consumer Choice
A policy of free trade also increases consumer choice. Protec-
tionist measures such as quotas permit only a limited supply of a for-
eign product to be sold in the domestic market. Consumers that want
to purchase a product that is subject to a quota may be precluded
from doing so because there just aren't enough units of the product to
go around.
If the restrictive trade policy takes the form of a tariff instead of a
quota, consumer choices are still limited because the tariff increases
the price they must pay. Having a high price serves to limit consumer
choices because not all consumers can afford to pay the higher price.
If the protectionist policy takes the form of an antidumping inves-
tigation, some foreign producers will decide not to do business in the
United States rather than comply with the administrative burdens that
come with an antidumping investigation. Matsushita, for example, de-
cided to abandon its small business telephone system sales' 7 to the
United States, thus losing more than fifty million dollars in export
sales,' because the Commerce Department demanded that Matsu-
shita translate three thousand pages of financial documents from Japa-
nese into English. The demand was made on a Friday afternoon, and
the project was supposed to be completed by the following Monday
morning. Being found guilty of dumping can also preclude a foreign
company from doing business in the United States, or can force a
company to raise its price to the extent that its products are priced out
of the market.
C. Protectionism Destroys More Jobs Than It Saves
Numerous studies have found that protectionist trade policies de-
stroy more jobs than they save. One study found that a certain pro-
tectionist policy would save 36,000 apparel manufacturing jobs but
destroy 58,000 jobs in the retailing end of the apparel industry.19 That
equals a job loss/gain ratio of 1.6 to 1.20 A study of the effects of the
1984 voluntary restraint agreement on steel imports found that the
agreement saved 16,900 jobs in the steel industry but destroyed 52,400
17 Investigation 731-TA-426. Listed in I.M. DErnER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITCS 393 (2d
ed. 1992).
18 JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD 136 (1991).
19 Laura Megna Baughman and Thomas Emrich, Analysis of the Impact of the Textile and
Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985, cited in I.M. DESTLER & JOHN S. ODELL, ANTi-PRO-
TECTION: CHANGING FORCES IN UNITED STATES TRADE POLITICS, 54, n.40 and 56, n.43 (1987).




jobs in the industries that use steel21 for a loss/gain ratio of 3.1 to 1.22
Another study of steel import restraints estimated that a particular
protectionist policy would save 27,072 jobs and destroy 40,927 jobs23
for a ratio of more than 1.5 to 1.24 Another study determined that a
fifteen percent import quota in the steel industry would save 26,000
jobs in the steel industry and destroy 93,000 jobs in the industries that
import steel25 for a loss/gain ratio of 3.6 to 1.26
D. Problems With Utilitarian Approaches to Trade Policy
There are several problems with taking a utilitarian approach to
trade issues. The fatal flaw is that the utilitarian approach ignores
property and contract rights. But there are other weaknesses as well.
One weakness with the utilitarian approach is that it is not possi-
ble to accurately measure gains and losses.27 So if the goal is to
achieve the greatest good for the greatest number, one must work
with estimates. Economics textbooks present their examples of the
application of marginal utility theory in terms of units, which they call
utils. Each util is assigned a numerical value. With each additional
purchase, the marginal utility declines.
For example, let's say that Jane is very hungry. She goes into a
fast-food restaurant and orders a hamburger for one dollar. Since she
is very hungry, the value of the hamburger, to her, is ten utils. And
since one dollar is worth only three utils to her,28 her satisfaction is
increased by surrendering the one dollar, worth three utils, for a
21 Arthur Denzau, How Import Restraints Reduce Employment, 80 Center for the Study of
American Business, (Washington University at St. Louis) (1987).
22 52,400/16,900 = 3.1.
23 Jose A. Mendez, The Short-Run Trade and Employment Effects of Steel Import Restraints,
20 J. WORLD TRADE 554-66 (1986).
24 40,927/27,072 = 1.5.
25 Arthur T. Denzau, American Steek Responding to Foreign Competition, 66 Center for the
Study of American Business, (Washington University at St. Louis) (1985).
26 93,000126,000 = 3.6.
27 For a detailed critique of this point, see MURRAY N. ROTBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND
STATE 260-68 (1970).
28 She places a value of three utils on one dollar, but other consumers may place different
values on one dollar. A rich person may place a value of 0.005 utils on one dollar, whereas a
poor person may assign a value of twenty utils to one dollar. And the number of utils' value for
a dollar may change with the same individual. As the individual spends more dollars, thereby
reducing the supply of dollars, the value of the next dollar - the marginal dollar - may change.
So the value of a dollar to a particular individual can change. It is not necessarily constant. It
should also be pointed out that a rich person does not necessarily derive fewer utils of benefit
from a dollar than does a poor person. This relationship is often assumed by economists (the
graduated income tax is based on the validity of this assumption), but this assumption may be
invalid.
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hamburger that is worth ten utils.29 She has gained to the extent of
seven utils. After finishing the first hamburger, she must decide
whether consuming a second hamburger would increase her happi-
ness. If she values the second hamburger at six utils and the next dol-
lar in her purse at three utils, she will decide to purchase a second
hamburger because doing so will increase her satisfaction. So she ex-
changes a dollar, worth three utils, for the second hamburger, worth
six utils. After consuming the second hamburger, she must decide
whether to buy a third hamburger. If the value of a third hamburger
to her is only two utils, she will decide not to buy since she is better off
keeping her dollar, which is valued at three utils, rather than exchang-
ing it for something that has a value to her of only two utils.
The problem inherent in using this approach is that utils are de-
fined in terms of definite, measurable units, whereas choices are actu-
ally ranks. We can say that she prefers two hamburgers to two dollars,
but we cannot say that she gains six utils by making an exchange. Ec-
onomics textbook writers use utils to illustrate how the marginal util-
ity theory works. But utils actually do not exist.
Attempting to apply the marginal utility theory to international
trade presents some problems. For example, if a certain protectionist
measure is applied to a particular product, we cannot determine by
precise measurement whether the gains received by the domestic pro-
ducers exceed the losses incurred by domestic consumers. And it
should also be pointed out that domestic producers and consumers are
not the only ones affected by protectionist policies. Foreign produ-
cers, their employees, the companies that would otherwise transport
the foreign product to the domestic market, the domestic import com-
panies and their employees, and the businesses that would otherwise
receive a portion of the import companies' employee salaries are also
affected.
Let's say that a particular protectionist measure causes the price
of the average shirt to be five dollars higher than would be the case
under free trade. So millions of consumers have to pay an extra five
dollars for a shirt, and domestic producers of shirts gain as a result.
But they do not necessarily gain the same total amount as the loss that
29 It should be pointed out that these values are subjective. If the seller of hamburgers also
valued one dollar at three utils and one hamburger at ten utils, there would be no trade because
the seller of hamburgers would be worse off if a trade transpired. The reason any trade takes
place is because the buyer and seller place different values on the products or services they buy
and sell. Both parties to a trade gain, in their own subjective judgment. The seller of hamburgers
would rather have the one dollar than the hamburger, and Jane would rather have the
hamburger than the one dollar.
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domestic consumers incur because some of the shirts consumers buy
will be manufactured by foreign producers. So an induced cost in-
crease also might benefit foreign producers (especially if the induced
cost increase is the result of a quota rather than a tariff). The pres-
ence of a quota will reduce the number of shirts that a foreign pro-
ducer can sell in the domestic market, but it will increase the unit
price the foreign producer can charge, thus increasing foreign pro-
ducer profit margins.
Fewer foreign shirts will be purchased as a result, which means
that the domestic import companies that would otherwise bring the
shirts into the United States will lose business. So they will need
fewer employees. And the money that these employees would other-
wise earn cannot flow into the purchase of autos, clothing and so forth
because these employees do not have jobs as a result of the protec-
tionist measure.
There is really no way to accurately measure the total gains and
total losses that result from a particular protectionist measure because
it is impossible to predict where the money will flow in the absence of
protectionism. But it can be concluded, a priori, that total satisfaction
will decrease if consumers have to settle for their second or third
choice because some protectionist measure prevents them from buy-
ing their first choice.
Another way to look at the effect of a protectionist measure, in
an attempt to determine whether the measure is good or bad, is to
predict who would gain and who would lose if the particular policy
were implemented. In the case of a protectionist measure on textiles,
for example, millions of consumers stand to lose because they would
have to pay higher prices. 0 But a few domestic textile companies
stand to gain by the passage of the measure. Based on this approach,
it might be concluded that the protectionist measure is bad because
many individuals (consumers) stand to lose something, whereas only a
few domestic textile manufacturers stand to gain. But this analysis is
30 Numerous studies have been made that attempt to measure the extent of consumer losses
that result from protectionism in various industries. In textiles and apparel, some results have
been as follows: GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, DIANE T. BERLINER & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT,
TRADE PROTECIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES: 31 CASE STUDIES 146 (1986) (the induced price
increase in textiles was 21%); WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE FUTURE OF WORLD TRADE IN TEXTI.ES
AND APPAREL 15 (1987) (the estimated price increase for textiles was 28%); HuFBAUER, BER-
LINER AND ELLIOTT 146 (1986) (39% price increase in apparel); Carl Hamilton, An Assessment
of Voluntary Restraints on Hong Kong Exports to Europe and the U.S.A., 53 ECONOMICA 339-50
(1986) (50% increase in apparel prices); Susan Hickok, The Consumer Cost of Trade Restraints,
FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. Q. REV., Summer 1985, at 1,7 (17% to 25% increase in apparel
prices); CLINE 15 (1990) (53% increase in apparel prices).
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superficial because the unit gains and unit losses are not equal. The
domestic textile producers stand to gain much if the measure becomes
law, whereas the millions of consumers who lose something would
only lose a small amount, perhaps five dollars per shirt.
Another fact to consider is that the textile manufacturers are
highly organized special interests, whereas the majority, the consum-
ers, are unorganized. It is in the textile manufacturers' best interest to
expend large sums of money to lobby Congress to pass the piece of
protectionist legislation. But it is rational behavior for the millions of
unorganized consumers not to organize to petition Congress not to
pass the bill. The cost of organizing, in terms of time, effort and
money expended, is just not worth it. It is better to pay an extra five
dollars a shirt than to try to counterbalance the special interest that
has the ear of the legislature.
This phenomenon is present regardless of which industry is in-
volved. The steel industry, auto industry, farm lobby and every other
producer of domestic goods stand to gain, in the short-run at least, if
they can convince Congress to protect them from foreign competition.
It pays for them to organize. And it is rational behavior for the con-
sumers of these items not to organize because the cost of doing so
exceeds the benefits to be gained by organizing.3 Thus, the special
interests have a built-in advantage over consumers.
The Public Choice School of Economics has been discussing this
point for several decades. Wherever the costs of lobbying are low and
the potential benefits are high, special interests will run to government
for protection or special favors. Public Choice economists call this
phenomenon rent-seeking: the seeking of special privileges or protec-
tion from government or getting others to pay for your benefits.32
31 There are some exceptions, of course. In some cases, one organized special interest lob-
bies Congress to pass a piece of protectionist legislation while another, opposing special interest
lobbies Congress not to pass it. For example, in some instances, the steel industry's attempt to
lobby Congress has been opposed by industry groups that use steel. And domestic auto produ-
cers that try to restrict foreign imports have been opposed by foreign car dealerships. So there is
sometimes organized opposition, a countervailing power where special interests do battle with
each other. For some case studies detailing specific instances where special interest groups have
engaged in this kind of activity, see I.M. DESTLER AND JOHN S. ODELL, ANTI-PRoTEcrION:
CHANGING FORCES IN UNITED STATES TRADE POLITICS (1987).
32 For more on the concept of rent-seeking, see TOWARDS A THEORY OF A RENT-SEEKING
SocETY (James M. Buchanan, Robert Tollison and Gordon ThIlock eds., 1980); THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 217-37 (Charles K. Rowley, et al. eds., 1988) (applying the theory
of rent-seeking to trade regulation); GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRVI-
LEGE AND RENT SEEKING (1989); GORDON TULLOCK, PRIVATE WANTS, PUBLIC MEANS: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TiE DESIRABLE SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT (1970).
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Another basically utilitarian argument is the public policy or
common good argument. If a policy of free trade is good, it is good
because it is in the public interest or it is for the common good. The
fatal flaw in this line of reasoning is that there is no such thing as "the
public." The public is just a collective term to describe the general
citizenry. The public does not eat, sleep and breathe. Only individu-
als do these things. Only individuals have interests. In a pluralist soci-
ety, these interests conflict.33 Auto manufacturers (their stockholders
and employees, actually) have an interest in seeing protectionist legis-
lation passed to protect them from foreign competition. And the mil-
lions of individuals who purchase autos have an interest in having low
prices and a wide variety of choices. Foreign auto producers also have
an interest in selling their products on the domestic market. While it
might be concluded that the public interest is in free trade, this conclu-
sion is reached on utilitarian grounds. The consumers who stand to
gain by free trade outnumber the auto company stockholders and em-
ployees who stand to gain by protectionism. [The interests of the for-
eign auto producers, their stockholders and employees are usually
ignored in arriving at this determination.]
Ayn Rand makes the following point about the concept of the
public interest:
Since there is no such entity as "the public," since the public is merely a
number of individuals, any claimed or implied conflict of "the public in-
terest" with private interests means that the interests of some men are to
be sacrificed to the interests and wishes of others. Since the concept is
so conveniently undefinable, its use rests only on any given gang's ability
to proclaim that "The public, c'est moi" - and to maintain the claim at
the point of a gun.34
Aside from this inherent weakness in the public interest argument is
the fact that the argument is sometimes used to protect special inter-
ests at the expense of the general public. It has been argued that the
passage of antimerger legislation is in the public interest, when in fact
such legislation often serves to protect entrenched, inefficient man-
agement at the expense of shareholders, consumers and the general
public.35 The farm lobby argues that it is in the public interest to have
a strong farm sector, so Congress passes legislation to subsidize the
33 Michael Novak points this out in FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD 19-22 (1989).
34 AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 116 (1964); see also THE AYN RAND LEXIcON:
OBJEcIvisM FROM A To Z 396 (Harry Binswanger ed., 1986).
35 For a discussion of this point, see Robert W. McGee, Mergers and Acquisitions: An Eco-
nomic and Legal Analysis, 22 CREIm-rrON L. REv. 665-93 (1988-89).
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farm industry and protect it from foreign competition at the expense
of the general public.3 6
Industry leaders whose companies are losing market share from
foreign or domestic competition petition Congress to regulate their
industry to prevent cutthroat competition, in the public interest.37 But
the effect of such legislation is to keep prices abnormally high, com-
pared to what they would be in a free market. Most antitrust actions
are initiated not by government but by competitors who see their mar-
ket share eroded by more efficient competitors. 8 Members of various
professions and occupations such as doctors, lawyers, accountants,
hair dressers, electricians, opticians, pharmacists, morticians, auto
mechanics, speech therapists, tattoo artists and so forth, petition the
legislature to pass licensure laws to protect the general public from
quacks when research shows that the loosening or repeal of such laws
results in higher quality service at lower cost.39
Another, related argument is the balancing of interests argument,
or the balancing of rights argument. This argument takes the position
that the rights of some individuals or groups must be balanced against
the rights of other individuals or groups. But this argument is just
another variation of the basic utilitarian argument. It is grounded in
positive rights theory, which we have already seen is fatally flawed.40
The balancing of rights argument, when applied to trade theory,
argues that the rights of foreign producers to sell their products on the
domestic market must be balanced against the rights of domestic pro-
ducers to be protected from dumping or unfair competition. There
are several weaknesses with this line of reasoning. For one thing, the
36 For more on this point, see JAMES BOVARD, THE FARM FIASCO (1989).
37 The Interstate Commerce Commission and numerous other government agencies were
created to protect industry leaders from loss of market share to smaller, more competitive com-
panies. For documentation of this point, see GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION
1877-1916 (1965); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963).
38 D.T. ARmENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE (1990);
D.T. ARmENTANO, ANTrrRuST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1986). For an in-depth discus-
sion of how the antitrust laws have been used by rent-seekers to feather their own nests at the
expense of the general public, see WILLIAM F. SHUOHART II, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREST-
GROUP POLITICS (1990).
39 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1962); OCCUPATIONAL LICEN-
SURE AND REGULATION (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980); S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF Ex-
PERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA (1987); OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST- COMPETITION OR MONOPOLY? (Robert Albon and Greg Lindsay eds., 1984);
STANLEY J. GROSS, OF FOXES AND HEN HOUSES: LICENSING AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS
(1984).
40 The balancing of rights theory is often discussed in connection with the First Amendment.
For a discussion on this point, see Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional
Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1987).
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rights of consumers to buy the products of their choice from the sell-
ers of their choice is often ignored. But more importantly, this argu-
ment assumes that domestic producers have some right to sell their
products even though consumers do not want to do business with
them. Domestic producers do not have their rights violated when a
foreign producer "dumps" products on the domestic market.41
Although they may be harmed by foreign dumping, their rights are
not violated because they have no property rights in transactions that
consumers do not want to enter into with them.
If a supermarket opens up across the street from a mom and pop
grocery store, there is no doubt that the mom and pop store will be
harmed by the competition. It may even be driven out of business.
But it cannot be said that their rights are violated by having the super-
market set up shop across the street. The supermarket has every right
to open a store across the street (not to mention the fact that consum-
ers will benefit by lower prices and a larger selection), and mom and
pop have no right to prevent consumers from taking their business
across the street if they want to. Government has no right to prevent
the supermarket from opening because there are no rights to "bal-
ance." Although the interests of mom and pop are diametrically op-
posed to the interests of the supermarket, government has no business
balancing these interests in one direction or the other. The real issue
is rights, not interests. When people speak about balancing "inter-
ests," what they really mean is balancing "rights." But in a negative
rights regime,42 rights can never conflict. You have the right to prop-
erty and so do I. You have the right not to be killed or confined and
so do I. It is only in a positive rights regime that rights can conflict
because the right of one individual or group must be sacrificed so that
another individual or group can gain something. Thus, the balancing
of interests argument suffers from several structural weaknesses.
III. THE RIGHTs APPROACH
A major problem with any utilitarian argument is that it is impos-
sible to precisely determine the total gains and the total losses. Thus it
is not possible to determine in many cases whether a particular policy
41 Many foreign producers that are accused of dumping their products on the market are not
really dumping, in the sense that they are not selling for less than the cost of production. And
even if they are, so what? Consumers benefit by the practice. Foreign producers can also be
found guilty of dumping if they sell their products for less than "fair value." But aside from the
fact that "fair value" is a completely arbitrary concept, this practice neither harms consumers,
nor violates anyone's rights.
42 Negative and positive rights are discussed below at Part HL
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results in the greatest good for the greatest number. But the fatal flaw
in any utilitarian approach is that utilitarian approaches ignore indi-
vidual rights. If the good outweighs the bad, a utilitarian would not be
concerned that someone's rights have to be violated to implement the
policy.
To illustrate this point, let's take an example. Let's say that John
is and always has been a sex-craved maniac. He has just been released
from prison after ten years of incarceration. During that time he has
not had sex. Now he is prowling the streets with the goal of making
up for lost time. He comes upon a prostitute who is lying on the side-
walk in a drunken stupor. He drags her into an alley and rapes her.
While he is ripping off her clothes, she protests by mumbling that he
should stop. But she does not put up any resistance and actually falls
asleep while he is committing the crime.
She has experienced almost no discomfort or disutility as a result
of John's act. But John has experienced a great deal of pleasure. Has
society benefitted by the act? A utilitarian would conclude that it had.
One person gained and one person lost as a result of the rape. It
appears to be a zero-sum game. But the person who gained, gained a
great deal, whereas the person who lost, lost only a little. The gains
exceed the losses, even if John's utility gain and the prostitute's utility
loss cannot be measured precisely, and the act can be declared to be
good on that account.
The example is outrageous, but the thought process a utilitarian
uses to arrive at a conclusion cannot be faulted on utilitarian grounds.
The reader may be quick to point out that the prostitute's rights were
violated in a very personal way by John's action. But rights violations
are of no concern to a pure utilitarian theorist. All that matters to a
utilitarian is whether the gains exceed the losses. The idea that some-
one's rights might have to be violated to achieve the goal is not worthy
of consideration.
But violating someone's rights is never necessary to achieve a
worthy goal. If someone's rights must be violated to achieve a goal,
the goal is not a worthy one in the first place. Utilitarian approaches
all begin with the premise that the end justifies the means. Rights
approaches begin with the premise that it is the process that is impor-
tant, not the destination. A trade policy based on utilitarianism can
have protectionist elements if it is determined that the winners from
the policy exceed the losers, or if it is determined that "society" bene-
fits as a whole. Under a rights approach to trade policy, "society" is
not even at issue. The issue is whether someone's rights, properly de-
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fined, are violated by the policy. If rights are violated, then the policy
is a bad one. If no one's rights are violated, then the policy is not a
bad one.
Which brings us to another important question: What exactly are
rights? Philosophers over the centuries have viewed rights from two
different and diametrically opposed perspectives. Negative rights in-
clude the rights to life, liberty and property. Stated in negative terms,
they would be the right not to be killed, the right not to be involunta-
rily confined and the right not to have your property taken from you
without your consent. Negative rights are inherent. They are not
rights that are granted by government. They are rights that come
before government. Governments are instituted to protect these
rights.
Positive rights advocates view rights from a different perspective.
Examples of positive rights include the right to medical care and the
right to subsidized rent. Positive rights are rights that are granted by
government. They are not inherent. And they are rights that are
gained at someone else's expense.
Under a positive rights regime, the rights of some must be sacri-
ficed so that others may have rights. In the case of medical care, for
example, those who claim a right to medical care gain this right at the
expense of others, who must provide it. Free medical care does not
mean that medical care is costless: The taxpayer has to pay. But it is
free to the recipient, because the recipient incurs no out of pocket
costs.
Rent control laws also work in this manner. If the law prevents a
landlord from charging eight hundred dollars a month (the market
rate) for an apartment, the difference between the actual rent and the
market price for the apartment is, in effect, a forceable transfer of
property from the landlord to the tenant. If the maximum rent that
can legally be charged is five hundred dollars and the rent that could
be charged in a free market is eight hundred dollars, then the landlord
is, in effect, having three hundred dollars of his property confiscated
each month and transferred to the tenant. The tenant's "right" to af-
fordable housing comes at the expense of the landlord. If the tenant
lives in a government subsidized housing project, the result is the
same, except that it is the taxpayer rather than the landlord who pays
for the tenant's right to affordable housing.
Losses always exceed gains under a positive rights regime if for
no other reason than the fact that there are transaction costs. The
landlord will not voluntarily write out a three hundred dollar check to
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the tenant each month. There has to be an enforcement authority
around the comer ready to enforce the law if the landlord does not
want to comply. An army of bureaucrats has to be retained to see that
the various redistributive laws are properly administered and en-
forced. So it cannot be said that a positive rights regime is a zero-sum
game, because the losses do not exactly offset the gains. The landlord
loses three hundred dollars a month and the tenant gains three hun-
dred dollars a month, but the cost of maintaining the enforcement au-
thority must also be counted, which leads to a negative-sum result.
Economists call this net loss a deadweight loss.
But whether this policy or that policy is a zero-sum game, a nega-
tive-sum game or a positive-sum game is really beside the point. Dis-
cussions about whether a policy is a negative-sum or positive-sum
game are utilitarian because the object is to determine whether the
gains exceed the losses. In a rights regime, gains and losses are irrele-
vant. All that matters is whether rights are violated in the negative
sense of the term.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
NAFTA, GATI and all other trade agreements are fatally flawed
because they begin (at best) from a utilitarian premise. If a trade
agreement is indeed intended to be pro-consumer rather than protec-
tionist,a3 advocates take the position that the trade policy should be
implemented because it benefits the majority, or that it benefits con-
sumers, or that it is in the public interest. But a proper position to
take is that a trade policy should be implemented or adopted if it does
not violate anyone's rights. The public interest, public policy or other
majoritarian arguments are totally beside the point and do not address
the real issue. Whether some policy benefits the majority is irrelevant,
not to mention not always easy to determine.
Arguments about the gains and losses involved in adopting
NAFTA, GAIT. or other trade agreements are off the mark and only
lead the debaters astray from the real issue. Whether a trade agree-
ment should be adopted or not should be determined solely on the
basis of whether anyone's rights are violated. If a trade agreement
would violate anyone's contract or property rights, the policy should
not be adopted. And if an existing trade policy violates anyone's con-
tract or property rights, it should be abolished immediately. The




proper function of government is to protect life, liberty, property and
contract fights and to otherwise leave people alone to seek their hap-
piness in their own way. These are the only functions that a govern-
ment can rightly perform in a pluralist society where individuals have
different interests and goals. Governments that prevent consenting
adults from entering into voluntary exchange are going beyond their
legitimate scope.
